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The object of this chapter is to identify historical relationships between
fiscal policy and the current account for the United States and five of its
major trading partners. I attempt to provide some measures of the extent to
which variations in budget deficits explain variations in current account
balances, both across time and across countries. Overall, the evidence
corroborates the view that fiscal deficits significantly contribute to a
deterioration of the current account. Indeed, it appears that U.S. budget
deficits have been responsible for roughly one-third of the U.S. trade deficit
in recent years.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the U.S. economy has been characterized by soaring federal
deficits and deteriorating trade balances. Many analysts suspect that these
features are closely, and perhaps even causally, related. Indeed, national
income accounting identities guarantee that budget deficits must create
either an excess of private saving over investment or an excess of imports
over exports. Standard economic reasoning suggests that government
borrowing decreases the domestic supply of funds available to finance new
investment, which leads to an inflow of funds from overseas. An offsetting
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adjustment to the current account is then required to reestablish interna-
tional account balance. In short, budget deficits may well produce trade
deficits.
This observation raises a number of questions concerning the effects of
alternative fiscal policies. To what extent can one attribute the current U.S.
trade deficit to budget deficits? How might legislation such as the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act affect the balance of payments? Is fiscal policy an
effective tool for influencing patterns of international trade?
The object of this chapter is to identify historical relationships between
fiscal policy and the current account for the United States and five of its
major trading partners. I attempt to provide some measures of the extent to
which variations in budget deficits explain variations in current account
balances, both across time and across countries. The reader should bear in
mind that even a strong empirical correlation between these two variables
does not necessarily indicate a causal relationshipthe fact that budget and
trade deficits have moved together in the past does not guarantee that the
current account will respond in the same way to future fiscal policy
innovations. Nevertheless, a robust empirical pattern would signal the
existence of some systematic underlying relationship and, in the context of
sound economic arguments, would lend support to the hypothesis that
fiscal deficits cause the balance of payments to deteriorate.
To the extent historical experience provides a reliable guide for policy,
my analysis of U.S. time series suggests that a $1 increase in government
budget deficits leads to roughly a $0.30 rise in the current account deficit.
I obtain similar figures for Canada, the United Kingdom, and West
Germany, as well as from an overall cross-country comparison. For Mexico,
the historical relationship between trade deficits and budget deficits sug-
gests that this effect is significantly larger, perhaps $0.80 to a dollar. In
contrast, for Japan the data appear inconsistent with the view that budget
deficits significantly affect the current account balance. This may well
reflect the stringent controls that the Japanese have traditionally placed on
international trade and flows of capital.
Overall, the evidence corroborates the view that fiscal deficits signifi-
cantly contribute to a deterioration of the current account. Indeed, it
appears that U.S. budget deficits have been responsible for roughly
one-third of the U.S. trade deficit in recent years. Accordingly, the
implementation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollurigs deficit reduction provi-
sions could dramatically improve the U.S. balance of trade.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the link
between budget deficits and trade deficits and describe the factors that
determine the quantitative importance of this link. Section 3 describes the
data used in subsequent sections. I conduct an international comparison inBudget Deficits and the Balance of Trade3
section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the U.S. experience. The remaining five
countries are considered in successive subsections of section 6. Finally,
section 7 summarizes and reviews my findings in the context of other
evidence on the effects of government budget deficits.
2. THE LINK BETWEEN BUDGET DEFICITS
AND TRADE
To clarify the relationship between fiscal deficits and the balance of trade,
it is helpful to begin with some national income accounting identities. First,
individuals dispose of income (Y) either as consumption (C), saving (S), or
taxes (I):
Y=C+S+T. (1)
Second, income must arise from either the domestic sale of consumption
goods (C), investment goods (1), governmental goods (G), or the net sale of
goods to foreign agents (exports, X, minus imports, M):
Y = C + I + G + (X - M). (2)




In words, equation (3) states that the government budget surplus is equal
to the trade surplus plus the excess of investment over private saving.
Suppose then that the government fixes spending (G), and cuts taxes (T),
thereby creating a deficit. Equation (3) indicates that, as a result, either the
trade surplus (X - M) must decline or the excess of investment over saving
(IS) must decline, or both. Note that this conclusion follows directly from
accounting and does not depend on any behavioral theories.
Nevertheless, whether the impact of budget deficits falls on X - M or
I - S is an open question. Indeed, there are two important conditions
under which fiscal policy would only affect I - S and leave net exports
unchanged. The first condition would arise if world capital markets were
completely nonexistent. In that case, all investment would have to be4Bern heim
financed domestically. Accordingly, private saving would always equal the
sum of investment and government borrowing. An increase in the deficit
would necessarily produce a commensurate increase in S - I, and X - M
would remain unchanged. The second condition would arise if taxpayers
did not believe that higher disposable income resulting from fiscal deficits
constitutes an increase in available resources. If people understand that
deficits merely postpone taxes, and if they expect to pay the postponed tax
at some point in the future, then they may respond to a tax cut by saving
all incremental disposable income toward the future liability. Accordingly,
saving would rise by exactly the amount of the deficitany change in T
(with G fixed) would alter S. and leave I, X, and M unchanged.
The empirical relevance of both these conditions is highly controversial.
The efficiency of world capital markets has been debated by Harberger
(1978, 1980), Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and Feldstein (1983). More recently,
Frankel (1986), Sachs (1981), Obstfeld (1986), and Summers (1986a) have
made significant contributions in this area. It now appears that interna-
tional capital markets are integrated to a very large extent, and that this
integration is in some ways imperfect. The extent to which individuals
anticipate and save for future tax liabilities has also received a great deal of
attention in recent years, with most of the discussion focusing on Barro's
(1974) notion of "Ricardian equivalence." In Bernheim (1987), I reviewed
the existing theory and evidence concerning the doctrine that fiscal deficits
are economically irrelevant, and concluded that this doctrine is not at all
descriptive of the U.S. economy.
Since it seems that neither of the two conditions described above holds
in practice, we may conclude that budget deficits almost certainly affect the
balance of payments. I have mentioned these conditions not because I take
them to be empirically plausible, but because they help us to identify the
factors that will determine the magnitude of the impact of fiscal policy on
trade deficits. If one believes that international capital markets are well
integrated and that taxpayers tend to consume out of disposable income,
then one is naturally led to the conclusion that this impact must be quite
large.
It is useful to trace the economic links between budget deficits and trade
in some detail. The standard story (see Branson (1985)) works as follows.
When the government cuts taxes (holding spending constant), taxpayers
respond by increasing consumption. If the economy is initially in a state of
full employment, national saving must fall. Domestic funds are then
insufficient to cover all profitable investment opportunities (at current
interest rates) plus government borrowing. This imbalance between the
supply and demand for funds places upward pressure on interest rates.
Higher rates lead to less investment and more saving, but this redressesBudget Deficits and the Balance of Trade5
only a portion of the imbalance. Attracted by the availabffity of more
profitable investment opportunities, foreign investors increase their supply
of financial capital to the United States. To accommodate this shift in the
international capital account, it is necessary to have an offsetting change in
the current account. Specifically, investments in the United States require
foreign capitalists to acquire U.S. currency. The resulting increase in the
demand for dollars drives the value of the dollar up, making it more
attractive for U.S. consumers to purchase imports and less attractive for
foreign consumers to purchase U.S. exports.
Alternatively, if the economy is not initially in a state of full employment,
then tax cuts may stimulate production. This would cause both national
income and private saving to rise. Accordingly, national saving may
decline much less than in a fully employed economy. The effect of budget
deficits on trade deficits is therefore likely to be smaller in the presence of
unemployed resources.
Finally, budget deficits may stimulate investment by raising the return to
capital. This could occur through two channels. First, in the presence of
unemployed resources, deficits may augment aggregate demand, thus
generating higher returns to investment. Second, deficits permit the
reduction of taxes on capital income, which raises the after-tax rate of
return. In either case, the effect is to widen the gap between investment
and national saving. International account balance then requires a larger
increase in the current account deficit.
Although there has been a great deal of empirical work on the efficiency
of international capital markets and the effect of government budget
deficits on national saving, there has been almost no effort to measure the
impact of fiscal policy on the balance of trade. Two exceptions are Milne
(1977) and Summers (1986b). Milne studied time series data from thirty-
eight countries for the period 1960-1975. Her strategy was simply to regress
the current account deficit on the government budget deficit for each of the
thirty-eight countries. This strategy produced mixed findings. Unfortu-
nately, in considering so many countries, Milne was unable to analyze the
data from any country in great detail and therefore failed to consider factors
other than fiscal deficits that might have influenced trade deficits in
systematic ways. As we shall see, the apparent absence of a systematic
relationship between fiscal policy and trade can often be explained upon
more careful analysis of the data. Although Summer's (1986b) findings
corroborate the view that budget deficits depress the current account
balance, his analysis was confined to the United States.
My strategy here is to employ a relatively small sample of countries: the
United States and its five largest trading partners (as measured by U.S.
exports). For each country, I analyze the historical relationship between6Bern heim
budget deficits and current account balances, paying careful attention to
third factors that might have influenced patterns of trade in any particular
year.
3. DATA
I focus on the experiences of the United States and its five largesttrading
partners (as measured by U.S. exports)Canada, the UnitedKingdom,
West Germany, Japan, and Mexico during the twenty-five-year period
from 1960 to 1984. With a few exceptions (noted below), the data are drawn
from the OECD National Accounts.
The first variable employed here is net saving for the general govern-
ment. The OECD defines net government saving as the sum of direct and
indirect taxes, the operating surplus of government enterprises, property
income, and transfers received minus the sum of final consumption
expenditures, payment of interest, rent, and royalties, subsidies, and
transfers made. The general government includes the central government,
social security funds, and all provincial, state, and/or local governments. I
use this variable as my measure of the government'sbudget surplus (the
negative of its deficit).
Although the OECD's measure of net government saving is appropriate
for accounting purposes, it is in some ways deficient for studying economic
behavior. For example, the OECD does not correct government deficits for
the inflationary erosion of the value of outstanding debt that occurs during
inflationary periods (see Eisner (1986) for a discussion). I have made no
attempt to remedy this problem. The reader should therefore bear in mind
that the relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits might be
somewhat obscured during inflationary periods.
The OECD also provides a measure of each country's current account
surplus, denominated in domestic currency. My primary objective is to
determine the extent to which variations in the budget surplus variable can
explain variations in this measure of the current account.
Throughout this investigation, I treat the budget surplus variable as
exogenous. In essence, I assume that budgets aredetermined indepen-
dently of the current account balance. This assumption is almost certainly
descriptive of the recent U.S. experience, but more generally its validity is
debatable. In particular, Summers (1986a) has argued that governments
systematically use fiscal policy tools in an effort to maintain approximate
current account balance. If this is true, then endogenous fiscal responses
wifi tend to create a negative correlation between the budget surplus and
current account surplus. By assuming that budgets are determined exog-Budget Deficits and the Balance of Trade7
enously, my analysis wifi therefore tend to understate the true relationship
between these variables.
It is also important to realize that budget surpluses and trade deficitsmay
move together for entirely spurious reasons. It is therefore necessary to
control for a number of third factors. First of all, since most macroeconomic
time series tend to grow over time, both variables must be scaled relative to
gross domestic product (GDP). Henceforth, I will use BSUR to denote the
ratio of the budget surplus to gross domestic product (also obtained from
the OECD National Accounts), and CAS to denote the ratio of the current
account surplus to GDP. Second, budget deficits, saving, and investment
(and hence the current account) all tend to move in systematic waysover
the course of the business cycle. Rather than use cyclically adjusted
variables, I control for business cycle effects by including current and
lagged values of real GDP growth (henceforth denoted GROW) inregres-
sion equations explaining the current account surplus. Finally, budget
deficits are systematically correlated with government consumption.
Higher government consumption should tend to depress national saving,
leading to larger current account deficits.I control for this effect by
including the OECD's measure of government consumption (henceforth
denoted GOV) as an additional explanatory variable insome of the
reported regressions.
Unfortunately, OECD data is not available for Mexico. Since Mexico is
the only developing country among the five largest U.S. trading partners,
its experience is of particular interest. As an alternative data source, I use
information collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), published
in the IMIF's International financial statistics and Government financial statistics.
There are several drawbacks to using this data. First, the IMF's methods of
accounting and sources of data differ from those of the OECD. This raises
the possibility that systematic differences may produce spurious results for
cross-country comparisons. Second, IMF data on the net saving of local
governments in Mexico is not available after 1982. Since local governments
save (or borrow) very little relative to the central government, I chose to use
central government net saving as my measure of the Mexican budget deficit
rather than to sacrifice the most recent years of data. Third, 11VIF dataon
government finances in Mexico are not available at all prior to 1972. My
analysis of Mexico is therefore confined to a much shorter timespan.
In the case of Canada, I also employ data on bilateral trade relations with
the United States. I obtain this data from the IMF's Direction of trade statistics.
The IMF measures the bilateral trade surplus in U.S. dollars; I express itas a
fraction of U.S. GDP (henceforth, I refer to this variable as BTS).
In analyzing these data, it is essential to bear in mind that these variables
are not the sole determinants of the trade deficit. Many other factors play8Bernheim
a significant role and may explainapparently anomalous fluctuations in the
current account. For the time period considered here, it isparticularly
important to think about the effects of three kinds of events.
First, from 1971 to 1973 international currency markets were in aperiod
of great flux. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixedexchange
rates in 1971 and the intervening turmoil before its eventualreplacement
with a system of floating exchange rates in 1973 undoubtedly disturbed
previous patterns of trade. Indeed, it is arguable that the sampleperiod
considered here should be divided into two subperiods in order to allow for
systematically different fiscal effects under fixed- and floating-exchange-
rate regimes.
Second, the 1970s witnessed two enormous shifts in relative prices and
the terms of trade, which were brought about by large increases in the price
of oil. The first oil crisis occurred at the end of 1973; oil pricesremained
abnormally high for 1974 and 1975. The second oil crisis was touched off by
the Iranian revolution in 1979. Oil prices rose sharply and remained at very
high levels through 1981. After 1981, the price of oil declined somewhat but
remained significantly above its precrisis level. During these periods,
deteriorations in the balance of trade for oil-importing countries (and
improvements for oil-exporting countries) are probably attributable tothe
oil crises rather than to fiscal policy. One must also bear in mind that some
countries, such as the United Kingdom, switched from oil-importing tooil-
exporting status between the two crises. Finally, the first oil crisisprecip-
itated a significant recession throughout the Western world. Since this had
a large impact on saving and theprofitability of investment, it may have
affected the current account balance in systematic ways.
Third, the United States began to run extremely large budget deficits
beginning in 1982. It is important to bear in mind that the current account
balance of each country should depend not only on its own budget deficit
but also on the budget deficits of its trading partners. In essence, it is the
relative size of budget deficits that determines which countries wifi import
capital and which wifi import goods. Thus, U.S. fiscal policy may well have
significantly affected the balance of payments for other countries. This is
particularly important in the cases of Canada and Mexico, since these
countries conduct disproportionately large fractions of their trade with the
United States.
4. AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
If fiscal policy plays a significant role in determining the balance of
payments, then we should observe a significant relationshipbetween these
variables, both over time and across countries. I wifi therefore begin my0,
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FIGURE 1. Cross-Country Comparison Ten-Year Averages, 1975-1984
analysis of the data by comparing budget deficits and trade deficits,
averaged over a substantial time interval, for the six countries inmy
sample.
As one averages over longer time periods, one finds less variation in the
current account surplus across countries. Accordingly, I have arbitrarily
chosen to study the most recent ten-year period in my sample (1975-1984).
For each country I compute ten-year averages of the BSUR and CAS and
plot the resulting averages in a scatter diagram (Figure 1).
Note that there appears to be a strong positive relationship between
budget surpluses and trade surpluses across countries. The line marked
"best fit" represents the best linear approximation to this relationship (as
determined by ordinary least squares regression). The slope of this line is
0.412, which indicates that a $1 increase in the budget deficit is associated
with a $0.41 rise in the trade deficit. Despite the fact that there arevery few
data points (only four degrees of freedom), this coefficient is estimated
quite precisely; its standard error is 0.108.
Note that the United Kingdom deviates from the best-fit regression line
more than any of the other countries. In light of the fact that the United
Kingdom became a major oil exporter in the late 1970s, just in timeto
benefit from the second oil crisis, it is hardly surprising that itscurrent
account shows an abnormally large surplus.
It is also noteworthy that Japan has both the highest government budget
surplus and the largest current account surplus over this ten-year period.
This fact is often obscured by official government statistics, which inrecent
years have shown the Japanese government running a substantial deficit.
It is essential to realize that Japan and the United States followvery
different accounting conventions when constructing their national income
-0.03 -0,01 0.01 0.03
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accounts (see, e.g., Boskin and Roberts (1986)). For example, theJapanese
do not include their social security system as part of the budget of the
central government. This particular omission is extremely important,
because the Japanese have accumulated substantial resources in social
security trust funds over the last several years. Thus, when one employs
the OECD accounts for the consolidated government, the Japanese gov-
ernment appears as a large net saver.
In contrast to Japan, Mexico has the largest budget deficit andthe largest
current account deficit over this ten-year period. As the onlydeveloping
country in this sample, Mexico's economic problems weredifferent from
those of the other five countries, particularly during the 1980s. Specifically,
a foreign debt crisis led to thevirtual suspension of foreign credit;
simultaneously, the IMF imposed an austerity program on the Mexican
government. Had foreign credit not been suspended, Mexicowould have
undoubtedly continued to run very large current account deficits after 1981,
and the relationship in Figure 1 would have been all the more pronounced.
Nevertheless, one might simply regard the Mexican experience as atypical
and argue that it should not be included in the cross-country comparison.
If one omits Mexico, a relationship between the budget surplus and current
account surplus is still evident, although the slope of the least squares
regression line falls to 0.276 (with a standard error of 0.174).
Unfortunately, the empirical pattern noted above may be produced by
spurious factors. For example, there may be cultural differences in attitudes
toward saving. In countries with high private saving rates, the government
may be fiscally conservative, whereas in othercountries extravagance may
characterize both the public and private sectors. Unless investment oppor-
tunities vary systematically with these same predispositions, countries
with high public and private saving wifi also run large current account
surpluses (see equation (3)). Thus, a positive correlation between budget
surpluses and trade surpluses does not necessarily indicate causality. It is
therefore necessary to explore the variation in fiscal policy and current
account balances over time as well as across countries.
5. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE
I wifi begin with an analysis of the U.S. time series. In Figure 2, I plot both
the U.S. budget surplus and current account surplus (as a percentage of
GDP) against time. One immediately notes a general coherence between
the two series. Both have been trending down gradually throughout the
twenty-five-year sample period. The shorter-term movements in these
series are also often coincident (e.g., between 1978 and 1979 or betweenYear
FIGURE 2.U.S. Time Series 1960-1984
1981 and 1983), although thereare some significant exceptions (most
notably between 1974 and 1976, when the two series movedsharply in
opposite directions).
It is much easier to see the historical relationship betweenthese two
series by plotting the trade surplus against the budget surplus ina scatter
diagram (see Figure 3). This diagram reveals that theseries are highly
correlated. In fact, with few exceptions the data pointsseem to line up
extremely well. The two exceptions are 1975, during which thecurrent
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account surplus was abnormally high, and 1984, inwhich it was abnor-
mally low. 1975 must be considered atypical becausetrade patterns were
undoubtedly disturbed by the first oil crisis, and many countries were
experiencing recessions. The large current account surplus mayhave been
due to the slow pace of the U.S. recoverypoor profitability mayhave
caused U.S. capitalists to seek investment opportunities abroad,causing an
offsetting movement in the current account (see equation (3)).The budget
deficit during these two exceptional years was roughly the same,about 3.5
percent of GDP. Thus, the outliers roughly offseteach other, and their
indusion does not much affect one's overall impressionof the relationship
between budget deficits and trade deficits.
It is possible to quantify the significance of thisrelationship through
linear regression. Specifically, the slope of the line that representsthe best
fit to the data points in Figure 3 is 0.161. This coefficienthas a standard
error of 0.069, which indicates that, with95 percent probability, the true
slope lies between about 0.02 and 0.30. A coefficientof 0.161 should be
interpreted as indicating that a $1 increase in the budget deficit isassociated
with a contemporaneous $0.16 increase in the current accountdeficit.
I have noted in section 3 that a variety of unusual eventstook place after
1971 (significant changes in the system of internationalexchange, two oil
crises, and large U.S. deficits). One must thereforewonder whether the
relationship considered here remained stable throughoutthe sample pe-
riod. I investigate this issue by dividing the sample period into tworoughly
equal segments: 1960-1971 and 1972-1984. In Figure 3, I havedifferentiated
between data points associated with each of theseperiods. Note that the
two subperiods have very different characteristics:before 1972 the United
States generally had budget surpluses and healthy currentaccount bal-
ances; in later years, deficits werethe rule. It is therefore particularly
striking that the relationship between fiscal policy and the currentaccount
remained essentially unchanged across the two subperiods.
In Figure 3, I have plotted least squares regressionlines for 1960 to 1971
and 1972 to 1984 separately. Note that these lines havealmost exactly the
same slopes. The regression linefor 1972 to 1984 is slightly lower, perhaps
reflecting a decline of the U.S. saving rate (independent offiscal policy
effects). However, the impact of budget deficits on the currentaccount
balance has remained stable over time. It is alsopossible that the relation-
ship observed in Figure 3 is due to spurious factorsthat I have not yet
considered. One possibility is that both fiscal policy and current account
balance vary systematically over the business cycle. Tocontrol for business
cycle effects, I regressed the current account variable (CAS) onthe current
budget surplus (BSUR), and current and lagged values ofreal GDPBudget Deficits and the Balance of Trade13
growth (GROW). In general, this strengthened the empirical relationship.
For example, with a single lagged value of GROW, I obtained
CAS = 0.0095 + 0.303 x BSUR - 0.0015 x GROW - 0.0011 x GROW(-1) + c
(0.0032)(0.080) (0.0005) (0.0006)
= 0.469
where GROW(-1) indicates the value of GROW from the previousyear,
reflects unexplained variation, and standard errors are given in parenthe-
ses. After we correct for cyclical variation, the observed relationship
between budget deficits and trade deficits is almost twice as large (the
coefficient of BSUR rises from 0.161 to 0.303). It is, of course, possible that
the current and lagged values of GROW control incompletely for business
cycle effects. It is therefore noteworthy that the inclusion of additional
lagged variables (GROW(-2) and GROW(-3)) reduces the coefficient of
BSLJR only slightly.
As mentioned in section 3, a positive correlation between budget deficits
and current account balances might also reflect variations in government
spending. To test for this possibility, I added the OECD's measure of
government consumption (GOV) to the list of explanatory variables. As
expected, the coefficient of GOV turned out to be negative (indicating that
government consumption contributes to the current account deficit). Some-
what surprisingly, the coefficient of BSIJR actually increased slightly (for
example, in a specification that included BSUR, GROW, GROW(-1), and
GOV, the estimated coefficient of BSUR was 0.324 with a standard error of
0.082).
Figure 3 and the preceding regression results make a strong case for the
existence of an empirical relationship between budget deficits and trade
deficits, but it is conceivable that this analysis of contemporaneous move-
ments overlooks a significant portion of the story. If, for example, interna-
tional capital markets are imperfect, then the effects of fiscal policy on
international trade may show up only after a lag. That is, capital may flow
across national borders in response to differential rates of profit, but it may
do so somewhat slowly.
Figure 1 tends to corroborate this conjecture. Generally, it appears that
movements in the current account have followed changes in the budget
deficit by one or two years. In fact, from 1974 on, the two series appear to
track each other extremely well when one shifts the budget surplus
forward by two years. In Figure 4, I have plotted the trade surplus against
the budget surplus lagged one year. Note that the relationship between


















FIGURE 4. Scatter Plot for United States 1961-1984
appear less extreme. Indeed, the slope of the regression line in. Figure 4 is
0.274. The standard error of this coefficient is 0.057, which indicates that,
with 95 percent probabffity, the true slope lies between 0.16 and 0.39. Thus,
the lagged effect is not only larger but is also estimated more precisely than
the concurrent effect.
Again we ask whether this relationship has been stable over the entire
sample period. Accordingly, in Figure 41 have distinguished between data
points from each of the two subperiods defined above (note, however, that
the earlier period must now begin in 1961 in order to accommodate the
need for a lagged value of the budget surplus). Both regression lines are
clearly downward sloped, although the line for 1972 to 1984 is somewhat
steeper. Given the variation around the regression line after 1971, this
difference carmot be considered terribly significant.
In light of Figure 4, it is appropriate to study the temporal nature of the
relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits more carefully. To
determine the precise pattern of these effects, I estimated a regression
equation explaining the current account surplus as a linear function of the
current budget surplus and the budget surpluses for the previous four
years. This procedure necessitated dropping the first four years of data. In
order to conserve on valuable degrees of freedom, I placed a restriction on
the pattern of coefficients (specifically, I required the lagged coefficients to
evolve as a third-degree polynomial). The results were not terribly sensitive
to the presence of cyclical variables; I report results based on a specification
that includes GROW and GROW(-1). I have plotted the estimated coeffi-
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FIGURE 5. The Effect of Budget Deficits on Subsequent Trade Deficits
cients in Figure 5. One interprets this figure as follows. When one controls
for previous fiscal policy, there is little if any concurrent relationship
between budget deficits and trade deficits. Most of the impact of the budget
deficit is felt one year later, and a substantial effect follows after twoyears.
Note that the coefficients for budget deficits three and four years in the past
are essentially zero (I should emphasize that I did not constrain the fourth
lagged coefficient to equal zero)all of the effects of fiscal policy on trade
are felt within two years. By summing the coefficients for the current and
lagged budget variables, I obtain an estimate of the total effect thata
sustained deficit policy would eventually have on the current account
balance. The sum of these coefficients is 0.366, with a standard error of
0.117 (this indicates that, with 95 percent probabffity, the true sum of these
coefficients lies between 0.13 and 0.60). Thus, a permanent increase in the
annual budget deficit of $1 is associated with a permanent $0.366 increase
in the annual trade deficit.
I also estimated a specification that included all of the explanatory
variables described abovea polynomial distributed lag on BSUR, GROW,
GROW(-1), and GOV. This specification has the advantage of controlling
for both cyclical effects and government spending while simultaneously
allowing for lagged fiscal effects. It is therefore noteworthy that this
procedure generated the most striking results: the coefficients on the
current and lagged values of BSUR summed to 0.628, with a standard
deviation of 0.107.
In summary, the data for the United States indicate that there isa strong,
stable relationship between the budget deficit and the trade deficit. Once
one allows for the fact that international capital markets may adjust slowly,
3 4 2
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FIGURE 6. Scatter Plot for Canada 1960-1984
the total effect estimated from U.S. data is roughly comparable to that
obtained from the international comparison.
6. THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES
In this section I analyze time series data from the five largest U.S.trading
partners (measured by U.S. exports) in order to determinewhether trade
deficits are systematically related to budget deficits.
6.1 Canada
In Figure 6, I plot the Canadian trade surplus against the Canadian budget
surplus in a scatter diagram. Taken as whole, the data do not appear to
reveal any clear pattern. Indeed, the best-fit regression line for the entire
period is slightly downward sloping. This is anomalous, because a down-
ward slope would imply that budget deficits actually improve the balance
of trade. On the other hand, the coefficient is very small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
The absence of a clear pattern may simply reflect the influences of
various third factors. If it is known that such factors led to atypical behavior
in specific years, then one should minimize the importance of those years
when searching for systematic relationships.
In the case of Canada, there are three years in which behavior was almost
certainly atypical: 1982, 1983, and 1984. I have already mentioned in section
3 that the U.S. began to run very large budget deficits in 1982. Since
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U.S. Budget Surplus
FIGURE 7. Bilateral Trade Balance between United States and Canada
1960-1984
three-fourths of all Canadian exports were destined for the United States),
one would naturally expect the Canadian current account balance to be
very sensitive to U.S. fiscal policy. Indeed, as noted in Figure 6, these three
years witnessed abnormally high current account surpluses (they corre-
spond to the three outliers in the upper left-hand corner of the diagram). It
is therefore possible that the favorable current account balances beginning
in 1982 simply reflect the effects of U.S. budget deficits.
To investigate this hypothesis, I analyze time series data on bilateral
trade between the United States and Canada. In Figure 7, I plot the bilateral
trade surplus for the United States (as a fraction of U.S. GDP) against the
U.S. budget deficit. Note that the data show a clear relationship between
the variables of interest. The only significant outliers are, as in section 5,
1975 and 1984. The large U.S. bilateral trade deficits with Canada in 1982
and 1983 are not at all abnormal, given the U.S. fiscal policy in thoseyears.
The question remains: can the effects of U.S. fiscal policyon bilateral
trade explain the three ouffiers in Figure 6? To answer this question, I
measure the effect of U.S. budget deficits on bilateral trade by computing
the least squares regression line for the data points in Figure 7. I find that
a $1 budget deficit is associated with a $O.064 increase in the bilateral trade
deficit for the United States. This coefficient has a standard error of $O.O11,
which indicates that it is estimated very precisely.
There are, of course, several problems with this measure of U.S. fiscal
policy effects. First, bilateral trade between the United States and Canada
should be affected by U.S. budget surpluses and by Canadian budget
-0.04-0.02 0 0.02 0.0418Bernheim
surpluses. To the extent fiscal policies are correlated across countries, a
simple regression of the bilateral balance on the U.S. budget surplus will
confound the effects of U.S. and Canadian policy. It is therefore necessary
to control for the Canadian budget surplus. Second, asbefore, systematic
variation over the business cycle may produce a spurious correlation
between the variables of interest. Accordingly, I regress the bilateral trade
surplus as a fraction of U.S. GDP (BTS) on the U.S. budget surplus
(BSURUS), the Canadian budget surplus (BSURC), and current and lagged
values of the real GDP growth rates for the United States and Canada
(GROWUS and GROWC, respectively). I obtain the following estimates:
BTS = - 0.0003 + 0.085 x BSURUS + 0.004 x BSURC + 0.0001 x GROWUS
(0.001)(0.024) (0.026) (0.0002)
- 0.0004 x GROWUS(-1) - 0.0002 xGROWC + 0.0002 x GROWC(-1)
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
= 0.662
Note that, after controlling for Canadian fiscal policy and business
fluctuations, I find an even larger effect of U.S. budget deficits on the
bilateral trade surplus ($0.085 on the dollar rather than $0.064). The only
anomalous result is that BSURC is positive. Note, however, that this
coefficient is dwarfed by its standard error, so that one cannot reject the
possibility that it is negative with any degree of statistical confidence.
Indeed, one can only conclude that, with 95 percent probabffity, the true
coefficient lies between -0.048 and 0.056. These values may appear small
in absolute value: since U.S.-Canadian trade is larger relative to total trade
for Canada than it is for the United States, one would expect a $1 increase
in the Canadian budget deficit to have a larger effect on bilateral trade than
would a $1 increase in the U.S. budget deficit. However, one must bear in
mind that the Canadian budget surplus is measured relative to Canadian
GDP, and all other variables are measured relative to U.S. GDP. Since U.S.
GDP is roughly eleven times as large as Canadian GDP, a coefficient of,
say, -0.02 would imply that a $1 increase inthe Canadian budget deficit
would increase net imports from the United States by about $0.22. Thus,
plausible fiscal effects are within one standard deviation of the estimated
coefficient. The data simply do not allow us to distinguish between
interesting hypotheses concerning the impact of Canadian budget deficits.
Also if one allows for lagged fiscal effects by incorporating polynomial
distributed lags on the budget surplus variables, the estimated cumulativeBudget Deficits and the Balance of Trade19
effect of the Canadian budget surplus becomes negative, although its
standard error remains quite large (the measured cumulative effect of U.S.
budget surpluses rises to more than $0.11 on the dollar).
What do these estimates imply about the effects of U.S. budget deficits in
the early 1980s? Prior to 1982, the U.S. budget deficit for the mostpart
remained below 2 percent of GDP; from 1982 to 1984, it increased to 4or 5
percent of GDP. Accordingly, the change in U.S. fiscal policy probably caused
the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with Canada to rise by about 0.25 percent of U.S.
GDP. This is equivalent to about 2.8 percent of Canadian GDP.
Now return to Figure 6. Note that I have plotted least squares regression
lines for each of two subperiods: 1960-1981 and 1982-1984. Observe also
that the vertical distance between the leftiiiost tip of the former and the
rightmost tip of the latter is about 0.03 (3 percent of Canadian GDP). The
arguments in the preceding paragraph therefore establish that U.S. fiscal
policy can account for virtually all of the favorable shift in the Canadian
balance of payments between the first and second subperiods.
Since it is possible to account reasonably well for the three outliers in the
manner described above, it seems likely that one would obtain the best
measure of the relationship between Canadian budget deficits and trade
deficits by focusing on the period 1960 to 1981. It is therefore noteworthy
that the slope of the regression line for this subperiod is 0.310, witha
standard error of 0.109. This is virtually identical to the effect obtained for
the United States in section 5. Note that the regression line for 1982 to 1984
also has a positive slope. The relationship simply appears to have shifted
upward. Unfortunately, it is impossible to estimate this slope precisely
with only three data points, so this conclusion is extremely tenuous.
Once again, it is desirable to improve this estimate by controlling for the
effects of business cycle fluctuations. Accordingly, I regress the Canadian
current account surplus (CAS) on the Canadian budget surplus (BSUR),
and current and lagged values of real GDP growth for Canada (GROW) for
the sample period 1960 to 1981. The estimated coefficientsare
CAS = - 0.019 + 0.310 x BSUR + 0.0001 x GROW- 0.0001 x GROW(-1) + e
(0.008)(0.169) (0.0012) (0.0013)
R2 = 0.289
Thus, the inclusion of cyclical variables has virtually no impacton the
estimated coefficient of BSTJR (although its standard error does rise). The
addition of GROW(-2) to the list of explanatory variables reduces the20Bern heim
coefficient of BSUR slightly; the addition of GROW(-2) and GROW(-3)
raises it to 0.418, with a standard error of 0.202.
Similarly, one should control for the potentially spurious effects of
government consumption. For each of the specifications mentioned above,
the addition of Canadian government consumption (GOV) as an explana-
tory variable reduces the measured effect of budget deficits only slightly, by
approximately $0.02 to $0.03 on the dollar.
As with the United States, it is also desirable to examine the timing of
Canadian fiscal effects. To do so, I follow the procedure outlined in section
5, adding four lagged values of the Canadian budget surplus and conserv-
ing degrees of freedom by requiring the corresponding coefficients to
evolve as a third-degree polynomial. This procedure yields cumulative
fiscal effects that are larger than the contemporaneous effects discussed
above (for example, with GROW and GROW( 1) the cumulative effect of
BSI.JR is 0.424). Unfortunately, the standard errors increase significantly (to
0.263 for the coefficient of BSLJR in the specification mentioned above). In
addition, the pattern of lagged coefficients is peculiar. The contemporane-
ous coefficient is, in general, very close to thecumulative effect, which
suggests that most of the impact is felt immediately. However, although
the cumulative lagged effect is typically close to zero, coefficients on
individual terms vary substantially. This evidence is somewhat ambiguous,
but I am inclined to conclude that Canadian fiscal effects are primarily
contemporaneous. This contrasts sharply with the U.S. experience.
One possible explanation for this difference is that the U.S. and Cana-
dian capital markets are very highly integrated, and the U. S. economy is
roughly eleven times as large as that of Canada. When saving falls short of
investment in Canada, funds from the United States can easily make up the
difference. Conversely, when Canadian saving exceeds investment, the
U.S. can easily absorb the residual. Furthermore, due to the high degree of
integration, this happens very quickly. On the other hand, when saving is
either high or low relative to investment in the United States, Canada is
simply too small to supply or absorb the residual funds. Instead, the rest of
the world must play that role. Since U.S. capital markets are generally less
well integrated with those of countries other than Canada, this tends to
occur after a lag.
In summary, when analyzing data on Canadian trade, one must explic-
itly allow for the important roles played by the United States and its fiscal
policy. Having done this, it is evident that there is a significant relationship
between the budget deficit and the trade deficit in Canada, and that the



































FIGURE 8. Scatter Plot for the United Kingdom 1960-1984
6.2 The United Kingdom
In Figure 8, I plot the British trade surplus against theBritish budget
surplus in a scatter diagram. As with Canada, the data donot initially
appear to reveal any clear pattern. Indeed, the least squares regression line
is flat, raising the possibility thatone of the two conditions discussed in
section 2 holds for the United Kingdom.
Upon closer inspection, systematic patternsare evident. As before, my
strategy is to identify years in which, on the basis of other information
about the British economy, one would have expectedto find atypical
behavior. In the case of the United Kingdom, thereare some obvious
candidates. In particular, there were three developments in the late1970s
that could well have changed the basic structural relationshipbetween
current account surpluses and budget deficits in Great Britain. The first
development was that Britain began topump oil in the North Sea and thus
became a major oil exporter. The second developmentwas the oil crisis of
1979, which, combined with the first development, vastlyimproved
Britain's terms of trade. The third and final developmentwas the election
of Thatcher's conservative government. Forreasons entirely unrelated to
the factors that improved Britain's current account, Thatcherattempted to
stimulate Britain's economy by reducing taxes. Although theresulting
deficits coincided with current account surpluses, itseems highly likely
that these surpluses occurred for independentreasons, and would have
been much larger in the absence of the deficits.22Bernheim
In view of these developments, it is natural to divide the sample into two
subperiods: 1960-1977 and 1978-1984. During the first subperiod, there is
a clear relationship betweenfiscal policy and the balance of trade. Indeed,
the least squares regression line has a slope of 0.326, with astandard error
of 0.121. Thus, a $1 increase in the budget deficit is associated with a$0.326
increase in the trade deficit. This result coincides almost exactlywith those
obtained for the United States and Canada, and is only slightly below the
estimate based upon my comparison of ten-year averages acrossthe six
countries in my sample.
It is once again desirable to attempt to control for third factorsthat might
have produced a spurious correlation between British tradeand fiscal
policy. Following the strategy used in earlier sections, I control forbusiness
cycle fluctuations by regressing the British current accountsurplus (CAS)
on the British budget surplus (BSTJR),along with the current and lagged
values of real GDP growth (GROW) for the period 1960 to 1977. The
estimated coefficients are
CAS = 0.013 + 0.322 x BSUR - 0.0008 x GROW + 0.0006 x GROW(-1) + g
(0.006)(0.119) (0.0009) (0.0009)
R2 = 0.445
The indusion of additional cyclical variables (lagged values ofGROW)
actually increases the measured coefficient of BSTJR and reduces its
standard error. For example, when one adds GROW(-2) and GROW(-3)
to the list of explanatory variables, the coefficient rises to0.369, with a
standard deviation of 0.090.
I have also estimated several specifications in which I controlledfor
government consumption (GOV), as well as for cyclicaleffects. As with
Canada, the impact of including GOV was to reduce slightly the measured
impact of budget deficits on the current account balance (in this case,by
approximately $0.06 on the dollar). The coefficient of BSUR remained
significant at conventional levels of confidence.
It is desirable to examine the importance of lagged fiscal effects asin the
preceding sections; however, this is impossible for Great Britain. The
inclusion of four lags would require me to drop the first four years of data.
Since I have truncated the sample at 1977, this leaves only fourteen data
points. Estimation of an intercept as well as coefficients for fiscal variables
(current and lagged values of BSUR) and cyclical variables (current and
lagged values of GROW) would leave only seven degrees of freedom. In
practice, the residual variation in the data is insufficient to identify this set
of coefficients with any precision.So far, I have confined attention to 1960 to 1977. Returning to Figure 8,
note that the least squares regression line for 1978 to 1984 also slopes
downward, but the slope coefficient is very small and estimatedvery
imprecisely. During this period there simpiy was notvery much variation
in the ratio of budget deficits to GDP, so recent experience in the United
Kingdom can tell us little about the effects of fiscal policy. Variation in the
current account balance undoubtedly arose from other sources, suchas
movements in the price of oil.
In summary, Britain exhibits a clear relationship between budget deficits
and trade deficits through 1977. The magnitude of these fiscal policy effects
appears to be roughly the same as for the United States and Canada, and
is only slightly lower than the figure obtained froman international
comparison. Due to developments in the late 1970s, Britain began torun
large budget deficits along with current account surpluses for completely
unrelated reasons. Variation in British fiscal policy since 1977 is insufficient
to allow precise measurement of fiscal effects.
6.3 West Germany
In Figure 9 I plot the German trade surplus against the German budget
surplus in a scatter diagram. To the extent there is a significant relationship
between fiscal policy and trade, it is obscured by the degree of variation in
the current account balance. Although the leastsquares regression line for
Germany is slightly upward sloping, it appears thatmany other lines
would fit the data almost equally well. More formally, the slope coefficient
Budget Deficits and the Balance of Trade23
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is 0.0185, with a standard deviation of 0.0872. Thus, the data areconsistent
with the hypothesis that there is no systematic relationship between the
budget surplus and the trade surplus. However, the data arealso consist-
ent with the hypothesis that a $1 increase in the budgetdeficit causes the
trade deficit to rise by nearly $0.20. Evidently, the variation inthe German
current account balance arising from third factors is too large toallow us to
differentiate between the various hypotheses of interest.
As in the preceding sections, one can use other information toidentify
years in which the behavior ofthe German current account might be
considered atypical. The most plausible candidates are years in which the
German economy suffered from the effects of the two oil crises.In Figure
9 I have separately identified data points from each offour subperiods:
1960-1973, 1974, and 1975 (the first oil crisis), 1976-1978 (the period
between the oil crises), and 1979-1984 (the second oil crisisand its
aftermath). It is possible to account for some of the current account
variation in this way. For example, German trade deficits were concen-
trated in the years 1979-1981, at the height of the second oil crisis. This is
understandable, since Germany imports most of its primary materials. One
apparent anomaly is that Germany ran its largest current accountsurplus
in 1975, during the first oil crisis. This is probably because thecrisis induced
a recession, and German investment was veryslow to recover. In the
meantime, savings flowed to other countries, producing a large current
account surplus in response. Nevertheless, even afterallowing for atypical
behavior in the oil crisis years, no clear pattern emerges.
It is also possible that cyclical variation in the budget deficit and current
account balance obscures an underlying relationshipbetween these two
variables. Following the strategy adopted in earlier sections, I control for
business cycle effects by regressing the current account surplus (CAS) on
the budget surplus (BSUR), and current and lagged values of real GDP
growth (GROW). The estimated coefficients are
GAS = 0.0057 + 0.189 X BSUR - 0.0005 x GROW - 0.0016 x GROW(-1) + 8
(0.0041)(0.166) (0.0011) (0.0012)
R2 = 0.083
Note that the coefficient of BSUR increases substantially to 0.189. Its
standard error is still relatively large, but the movement in this coefficient
suggests that cyclical fluctuations bias the coefficient ofBSUR downward.
Although I have noted a similar bias in previous sections, the effect here is
far larger and hence much more important. The direction of this biasBudget Deficits and the Balance of Trade25
should not be surprising: during booms, rising income generates increased
tax revenues and hence reduces deficits; at the same time the demand for
imports rises with disposable income, contributing to a deterioration of the
balance of payments.
Since cyclical fluctuations are evidently very important for West Ger-
many, it is important to determine whether a single lagged value of GROW
fully controls for factors that induce the spurious correlation. Accordingly,
I also estimate specifications in which I include additional lagged values of
GROW as explanatory variables. The addition of GROW(-2) raises the
estimated coefficient of BSUR to 0.330 (with a standard deviation of 0.205);
the addition of both GROW(-2) and GROW(-3) raises the coefficient to
0.547 (with a standard error of 0.240). Note that this last coefficient is
statistically significant at conventional levels of confidence. Thus,as one
controls more completely for business fluctuations, the observed relation-
ship between budget deficits and trade deficits becomes stronger.
As in previous sections, it is also important to control for the effects of
government spending. The addition of the government consumption
variable (GOV) to the specifications discussed abovecauses the coefficient
of BSUR to decline slightly (e.g., by $0.02, $0.06, and $0.09on the dollar,
respectively, for the specifications with one, two, and three lagged values
of GROW). The overall relationship between budget deficits and trade
deficits remains quantitatively large.
Finally, it is useful to explore the effects of fiscal policyon German trade
patterns through time. I follow the strategy adopted in previous sections,
adding four lagged values of the budget surplus as explanatory variables
and constraining the lagged coefficients to evolveas a polynomial distrib-
uted lag. The estimated cumulative effect of BSURon CAS is much larger
than the contemporaneous effect discussed above: withone lagged value of
GROW, it is 0.542 (with a standard deviation of 0.181); with two lagged
values of GROW, it is 0.603 (with a standard deviation of 0.221). However,
as with Canada, the pattern of lagged coefficients is somewhat peculiar
the coefficient on the current value of BSLJR is virtually equal to the
cumulative effect, and coefficients on the lagged variablesvary between
fairly large positive and negative numbers, withno apparent pattern.
Although this evidence is somewhat ambiguous, Iam inclined to conclude
that West German fiscal effects are primarily contemporaneous.
In summary, business fluctuations appear to obscurea systematic
relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits in West Germany.
When one controls for such effects, the impact of fiscal policyon the current
account appears to be as large, if not larger, for West Germany as it is for



























FIGURE 10. Scatter Plot for Japan 1960-1984
6.4 Japan
In Figure 10 I plot the Japanese trade surplus against the Japanesebudget
surplus in a scatter diagram. The data appear to rule out the existence of a
significant positive relationship between these two variables. The slope
coefficient of the least squares regression line is -0.125, with a standard
error of 0.109. This estimate is inconsistent with the viewthat Japanese
budget surplus significantly contributes to Japanese trade surpluses.
Unlike Germany, the Japanese government takes a strongly interven-
tionist role with respect to international trade. Japan has traditionally
regulated imports, exports, and capital flows. The absence of a strong
relationship in Figure 10 may reflect the relative importance of these other
interventionist policies in determining the Japanese current account bal-
ance.
Once again one can attempt to account for the lack of a clear relationship
by using other information to identify years in which behavior was
probably atypical. However, as with Germany, this effort meets with very
little success. In Figure 10 I have separately identified data points for each
of the subperiods described in section 6.3. As expected, one sees deterio-
rating current account balances during periods of high oil prices (1974,
1975, and 1979-1981), reflecting Japan's status as a major oil importer. Yet
no clear pattern emerges even when these years aredeleted.
In view of my results concerning West Germany, it is extremely impor-
tant to control for the effects of business cycles. Yet evenwhen one
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surplus and current and lagged values of real GDP growth, fiscal effectsof
the sort observed in previous sections fail to materialize. In all specifica-
tions, the coefficient of BSUR remains negative, although it isnever
significant at conventional levels of statistical confidence. The additionof a
government consumption variable (GOV) does not alter this conclusion,
nor does the estimation of polynomial distributed lags.
We can gain some insight into the Japanese experience by referring again
to Figure 10. This diagram reveals a cleavage betweena large group of high
budget surplus years (in which surpluses ranged from about 6 to 8percent
of GDP) and a large group of low budget surplusyears (in which surpluses
ranged from about 2 to about 4 percent of GDP). As it happens, the first
group of points represent the years 1960-1974, and the second group
represent 1975-1984. Apparently, high prices for primary goods during the
first oil crisis forced the Japanese government to reduce its budgetsur-
pluses, and since then Japan has never reestablished its previous levels of
fiscal restraint. Note that within each of these subperiods the variationin
budget deficits is very small relative to the variation in the Japanesecurrent
account balance. Thus, within-period movements in these variablesare
insufficient to establish the magnitude of fiscal effects. The slope of the
regression line is primarily determined by differences inaverages before
and after the cleavage. Because the late 1970s and early 1980s differed ina
large number of important respects from the 1960s and early 1970s, this
observation casts doubt on the validity of the finding that fiscal effectsare
insignificant in Japan. It does not, however, establish that the datasupport
the existence of large fiscal effects.
In summary, the data for Japan appear to support the view that budget
deficits do not cause significant deterioration of the currentaccount.
Nevertheless, this finding is primarily derived froma comparison of the
average Japanese experience before and after 1975, and may reflect spuri-
ous factors.
6.5 Mexico
In Figure 11 I plot the Mexican trade surplus against the Mexican budget
surplus in a scatter diagram. As with Canada, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany, the data do not, as a whole, revealany clear pattern. In
fact, the least squares regression line for the entire period is absolutely flat.
This appears to suggest that budget deficits have no effecton trade, and
that Mexico satisfies one of the two conditions discussed in section 2.
Upon closer inspection, one quickly sees that this conclusion isun-
founded. Other information strongly suggests that the events of the early
1980s was extremely atypical, and that the Mexican current account balance


















FIGURE 11. Scatter Plot for Mexico 1972-1984
experienced a foreign debt crisis in 1982. This led to a virtual suspension of
foreign credit and to the adoption of a rather severe austerity program. The
resulting sharp decline of capital inflows produced a dramatic improve-
ment in the Mexican current account, completelyindependently of any
ordinary economic influences. At the same time it was generallybelieved
that the Mexican government would be tempted to monetize asubstantial
fraction of its outstanding debt. This expectation undoubtedly resulted in a
devaluation of the Mexican currency, which led to a further improvement
in the current account. Thus, fears of monetization may haveproduced a
spurious relationship between budget deficits and the current account
surplus during a period in which net exports were already artificiallyhigh.
Not surprisingly, the data points corresponding to 1982, 1983, and1984
appear as extreme outliers in Figure 11.The remaining points are closely
grouped together and give clear evidence of a strong positive relationship
between the Mexican budget deficit and trade deficit. Theslope of the least
squares regression line for this subperiod is0.853. Although it is estimated
somewhat imprecisely (a standard error of 0.251), one can nevertheless
conclude that the slope of the true relationship lies between 0.35 and 1.35.
Note that even the lower end of this range exceeds the point estimatesfor
the United States and Canada.
As in the preceding sections, it is desirable to control for the effectsof
business cycle fluctuations. A regression of the Mexican current account
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lagged values of real GDP growth (GROW) yields the following coeffi-
cients:
CAS = 0.002 + 0.749>< BSUR + 0.0001XGROW - 0.0016XGROW(-1) + c
(0.01?)(0.302) (0.0018) (0.001?)
R2 = 0.653
Although the inclusion of proxies for the business cycle somewhat reduces
the coefficient of BSUR, the estimated fiscal effect remains extremely large.
This conclusion holds up when one adds GROW(-2) and GROW(-3) to
the list of explanatory variables.
As with Canada, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, the inclusion
of a measure of government consumption (GOV) reduces the estimated
fiscal effect. In a regression of CAS on BSUR, GROW, GROW(-1), and
GOV, the coefficient of BSUR was 0.557, with a standard error of 0.257.
Despite this reduction, the coefficient remains quite large.
Because data on Mexico are unavailable before 1972, the Mexican time
series is extremely short. It is therefore impossible to determine the lagged
effects of fiscal policies through the estimation of polynomial distributed
lags.
Why should the effect of fiscal policy be so much larger in Mexico than
in the United States or Canada ? Recall from the discussion in section 2 that
the magnitude of the fiscal effect depends in large part upon the extent to
which consumers spend out of increases in disposable income. For a
relatively poor country like Mexico, this propensity to consume may be
extremely high. Indeed, many consumers may save nothing at all. As a
result, a $1 tax cut may cause consumption to rise (and national saving to
fall) by nearly $1. Foreign funds are required to make up the difference, and
the current account adjusts accordingly.
Turning to the data for the early 1980s, note finally that the least squares
regression line for 1982 to 1984 is roughly parallel to the line for 1960 to
1981. As with Canada, the relationship between the budget surplus and
trade surplus simply seems to have shifted upward toward a more
favorable balance of payments, although once again it is impossible to draw
any clear inferences on the basis of three data points.
In summary, the Mexican economy exhibited a strong and clear relation-
ship between the budget deficit and the current account through 1981.
Quantitatively, the effects of fiscal policy on patterns of trade were
significantly larger for Mexico than for any of the other countries consid-
ered. After 1981 these effects were obscured by the Mexican debt crisis.30Bernheim
7. CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of time series data for six countries reveals a robust and significant
link between fiscal policy and trade deficits. For the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and West Germany, a $1 increase in the budget
deficit is associated with roughly a $0.30 decline in the current account
surplus. A cross-country comparison produces a slightly higher figure
($0.40). Fiscal effects are substantially larger for Mexico (perhaps as much as
$0.85 on the dollar). No fiscal effects are evident for Japan, but this evidence
is very weak.
At this point there is a very large empirical literature on the economic
effects of government budget deficits. It is useful to review these findings
in the context of this literature in order to produce a coherent view of fiscal
policy. I recently reviewed this literature (see Bernheim (1987)) and reached
the following conclusions. First, a number of studies have identified a
strong positive relationship between fiscal deficits and private consump-
tion. This finding is extremely robust. Generally, most studies estimate that
the effect of increasing the deficit by $1 is to raise private consumption by
about $0.30. Second, the evidence on the relationship between budget
deficits and the interest rate is extremely mixed. No one has yet made a
compelling empirical case for. the view that budget deficits significantly
raise interest rates.
Both of these conclusions are consistent with my current findings. If we
suppose that international capital markets work reasonably well (andrecall
that there is an independent body of research that, on balance, supports
this view), then budget deficits should not alter domestic investment. In
fact, interest rates will be largely determined in the world capital market. It
is therefore not at all surprising that various economists have been unable
to identify a robust empirical relationship between fiscal policy and interest
rates. On the other hand, government borrowing does depress national
saving. If we take this effect to be $0.30 on the dollar (as suggested in the
preceding paragraph) and suppose that investment remains fixed, we are
led to the conclusion that a $1 increase in the budget deficit attracts $0.30 of
investment funds from abroad, creating an offsetting $0.30 movement in
the current account. This is exactly the magnitude of the effect that I have
estimated here.
Only one anomaly remains. In a recent paper, Evans (1986) has argued
that there is no empirical relationship between budget deficits and ex-
change rates. This is troublesome because the economic mechanism
described in section 2 hypothesized that the current account would
deteriorate in response to an appreciation of the domestic currency.Budget Deficits and the Balance of Trade31
Evans's results are, however, contradicted by Feldstein (1986), who finds
that the value of the dollar rises significantly in response to budget deficits.
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